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The goal of science is to advance knowledge, yet little is known about its value for marketplace
inventions. While important breakthrough technologies could not have been developed without
scientific background, skeptics argue that this is the exception rather than the rule, questioning the
usefulness of basic research for private sector innovations and the effectiveness of the knowledge
transfer from university to industry. We analyze the universe of U.S. patents to establish three
new facts about the relationship between science and the value of inventions. First, we show that
a patent that directly builds on science is on average 2.9 million U.S. dollars more valuable than a
patent in the same technology that is unrelated to science. Based on the analysis of the patent text,
we show second that the novelty of patents predicts their value, and third that science-intensive
patents are more novel. This documents that science introduces new concepts that are valuable
for marketplace inventions. Our study informs the debate on the merits of science for corporate
innovation and the origins of breakthrough inventions.
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“Science, by itself, provides no panacea [...] But without scientific progress no amount of
achievement in other directions can insure our health, prosperity, and security as a nation”
Vannevar Bush
1 Introduction
According to philosopher Francis Bacon “The true and legitimate goal of the sciences is to endow
human life with new discoveries and resources” (Mokyr, 2016). Yet surprisingly little is known about
how much scientific knowledge contributes to the development of marketplace innovations and their
commercial success. Some well-known examples document that science can play an important
role for the development of technological breakthroughs. Ferdinand Braun and Guglielmo Marconi
could not have developed the wireless telegraph before Heinrich Hertz showed the existence of
electromagnetic waves. Similarly, the development of the transistor at the Bell Laboratories would
have been difficult to imagine without the scientific understanding of the physics of semiconductors.
Skeptics have argued that these cases are the exception rather than the rule and that ideas for
inventions usually come from other sources than science (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986; von Hippel,
1988). They are concerned that science is trapped in an ivory tower and has little direct application
in private companies. Given the public good character of scientific knowledge and the reward
structure for scientists (Stephan, 1996), it is indeed non-obvious that they engage in basic research
that matters for private sector applications. Moreover, skeptics argue that the knowledge transfer
from university to industry does not work effectively or doubt the reliability of the knowledge
produced at universities (Goozner, 2005; Butler, 2008; Harris, 2011; Osherovich, 2011; Freedman
et al., 2015; Bikard, 2018).
While these are potentially important concerns, to date there is no empirical evidence that
would allow us to quantify the overall impact of science on marketplace innovations. In this study,
we provide such a quantification by measuring the contribution of science to the value of patented
inventions in the private sector. Any attempt to measure this contribution is complicated by the
fact that science plays a larger role in some technologies than in others (Stephan, 1996). This makes
it difficult to distinguish how much of the value of an invention is due to science and how much of
it is technology-specific. We solve this challenge with the help of a metric for how science-intensive
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a patent is. By comparing the values of more and less science-intensive patents within different
technology classes, we can isolate the science component and the technology component of the
value of each invention.
To classify patents with respect to their distance to science we build on Ahmadpoor and Jones
(2017). When a company files for a patent it has to list all prior art on which the patents build,
including scientific articles. This provides a direct link between the patent and the scientific knowl-
edge it makes use of. A patent that directly cites a scientific paper is assigned a distance of one
(D=1) to science. A patent that cites a (D=1)-patent but does not cite a scientific article itself has
a distance of D=2, and so on. We match this data with the patent values from Kogan et al. (2017).
Kogan et al. (2017) derive patent values from excess stock returns of the filing company around the
date of the patent publication. Combining these two data sets, we can calculate the average patent
value for a given distance to science for 1.2 million U.S. patents filed between 1980 and 2010.
We find that patents directly based on science have on average a private value that is 2.9 million
U.S. dollars larger than patents filed in the same technology class and year but only losely related to
science. Patents with a distance of two (three) have an implied value of science of $ 2.2 million ($ 0.9
million) U.S. dollars. This propagation of value generated by science to patents that are not directly
science-based suggests that scientific progress can be the “remote dynamo of technology innovation”
throughout the economy (Stokes, 2011, p.84). Yet, we also show that more science-intensive patents
are more risky; i.e., more likely to end up in the tails of the value distribution. In auxiliary results,
we show that our main findings are stable when using alternative measures for distance to science
based on text similarity and when using alternative measures for patent value based on citations
and patent scope from Kuhn and Thompson (2017).
What makes science-based patents particularly valuable? We identify the novelty of scientific
ideas as the link between scientific research and private sector value. To establish this link, we
develop a new measure of patent novelty based on the novelty of words in the text of the patent. For
this purpose, we calculate for each patent the probability that a given combination of keywords has
been used before. We call a patent “novel” if it contains keyword combinations with low probability.
We document that patent novelty predicts the value of patents in a very similar way as the science-
intensity of patents does. Finally, we establish that the content of more science-intensive patents is
more novel and that the novelty of the content decreases with distance to science. More specifically,
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we document that the novelty of science-based patents is driven by novel concepts, not by novel
combinations of existing concepts.
Our paper contributes to the literature in two main ways. First, it highlights that science creates
value in the private sector, not only directly, but also indirectly, and it quantifies the respective value
contributions in dollars. In intent, this is close to the early surveys of Edwing Mansfield, which
showed that in the 1980s and the 1990s around 20 percent of all newly introduced products benefited
substantially from recent academic science (Mansfield, 1991, 1995, 1998). The recent literature is
primarly focussed on patents that are directly science-based and on value measures such as forward
citations and patent renewal payments, which reflect only indirectly and partially the private value of
the patents for the owner. Sorenson and Fleming (2004) show that science-based patents have more
follow-on citations. Poege et al. (2019) find that the quality of cited scientific articles is positively
related to various monetary and non-monetary measures of patent value. Ahmadpoor and Jones
(2017) document that forward citations decrease with distance to science and that patents close to
science are more likely to be renewed. We add to these findings by showing that based on stock-
market returns the direct effect of science accounts - in dollar terms - for only around one third of
the overall private value. By estimating the monetary private value of science-based patents our
results allow to gauge the private incentives of patenting inventors to use science for innovation
purposes.
Second, our paper takes an important step towards understanding the role of science for the
value of patents by showing that science and the novelty of the innovations protected by the patent
go hand in hand. Basic science is frequently credited with stimulating technological innovations.
In the context of World War I, Iaria et al. (2018) have recently shown that scientists produce more
patent-relevant scientific articles if they have access to frontier knowledge. Yet, the mechanisms for
how science creates value have been little explored. Fleming and Sorenson (2004) have argued that
science alters inventors’ search processes and leads them to useful new knowledge combinations.
We find direct evidence for this mechanism studying the use of novel keyword combinations. Our
measure is inspired by Uzzi et al. (2013) who use uncommon combinations of citations to journals
as a measure for the novelty of an academic article.1 Thus, our study complements the indirect
1Uzzi et al. (2013) show that more novel articles are more likely - under some conditions - to end up in the top
5% of the citation distribution.
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evidence in Fleming and Sorenson (2004), which shows that science increases forward citations in
fields in which it is hard to innovate.2 By linking patent novelty to patent value and science to
patent novelty we provide a rationale for why science matters for private sector innovation.
2 Data
Our starting point is a dataset which contains information on the monetary value of 1.8 million
patents from 1926 to 2009 (Kogan et al., 2017). The private value of the patent is estimated
by studying movements in stock prices following the days that patents were issued to the firm.
Specifically, the value is approximated using the abnormal stock market return of the filing company
within a narrow window around the grant date of the patent.
We calculate for each of these patents its distance to prior scientific advances using the method
of Ahmadpoor and Jones (Ahmadpoor and Jones, 2017). We use information on 2.5 million patents
issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) from 1980 to 2010 and information on
journal articles indexed by Microsoft Academic (Sinha et al., 2015). We then locate patents that
directly cite journal articles; i.e., patents where practical inventions and scientific advances are
directly linked (Marx and Fuegi, 2019). A patent that directly cites a scientific paper is assigned a
distance of one (D=1) to science. A patent that cites a (D=1)-patent but does not cite a scientific
article itself has a distance of two (D=2), and so on. The distance for each patent to science is
thus defined by the minimum citation distance to the boundary where there is a direct citation link
between patent and scientific article.
Combining the information on patent values and citation links, we construct a dataset that
contains patent values for 1.1 million U.S. patents filed between 1980 and 2009. 19% of all patents
directly cite a patent (D=1), 55% are indirectly based on science (D=2 and D=3) and 26% are not
based on science (D=4 or larger). The average value of a patent is 12.9 million in constant 1982
U.S. dollars. Appendix A gives a detailed description of the data construction and sources.
2Recently, Kelly et al. (2018) have shown that the value of patents as measured by Kogan et al. (2017) is negatively
correlated with their text similarity to earlier patents. We add to these findings by demonstrating that patent novelty
systematically correlates with the scientific content of a patent, measured both by citation distance and by text
similarity between articles and patents.
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3 Results
In the following, we first map the relation between private sector value and distance to science. We
show that patents closer to science have a higher value than patents further away from science. In
a second step we show that patents that are more novel are also more valuable. Lastly, we show
that patents closer to science are also more novel, highlighting a potential reason why science-based
patents are more valuable.
3.1 The private value of patents by their distance to science
Our first fact documents the relationship between patent values and distance to science. We show
that more science-intensive patents are on average more valuable but also riskier; i.e., they are more
likely to be in the tails of the value distribution. We start by presenting average dollar values of
patents along with 95% confidence bounds for different distances to science. As shown in Figure 1,
Panel (a), a science-based patent that directly cites an academic article (D=1) has an average value
of 17.7 million dollars. This value decreases as the distance to science increases. Patents with a
distance of two have on average a value of 14.1 million dollars while patents with a distance larger
than three have a value between 8 and 10 million dollars. The last set of patents (“unconnected”)
do not contain any reference to science or science-based patents. These patents have on average a
value of 8.9 million dollars.
The higher average value of science-based patents reflects an upward shift in the value distribu-
tion of patents with higher science intensity. Panel (b) of Figure 1 plots the share of science-intensive
patents (D=1, D=2 and D=3) and the share of less-science intensive patents (D=4, D=5, D>5 and
unconnected) over the percentiles of the value distribution of all patents. If the value distribution
of more science-intensive patents were the same as the value distribution of less science-intensive
patents, the share of patents at each percentile should be 1%. Figure 1, Panel (b) shows that
there are fewer science-intensive patents at the lower end of the value distribution while there are
more at the upper end. The pattern for less-science-intensive patents is (mechanically) reversed.
They are overrepresented at the lower end of the value distribution, while they are significantly
underrepresented at the upper end.
We examine next whether this regularity between distance to science and patent value simply re-
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Figure 1: Distance to science, patent value and risk.
Panel (a) shows the average patent value for all distances to science. The values of U.S. patents are from Kogan
et al. (Kogan et al., 2017). The distance to science of U.S. patents is calculated with Microsoft Academic and
Patstat using the method of Ahmadpoor and Jones (Ahmadpoor and Jones, 2017). The distance to science is defined
by citation links. The 95% confidence bounds are based on standard errors bootstrapped by CPC technology class.
Panel (b) shows the distribution of patent values across the percentiles of the value distribution of all patents for more
science-intensive patents ( D=1, D=2 or D=3; solid red line) and less science-intensive patents (D>3 or unconnected;
dashed blue line). The horizontal line at 0.01 shows the distribution of all patents across the percentiles of the value
distribution. In Panel (c), we residualize the patent value by the average value of a patent with the same CPC
technology class and filing year and a distance of four. In Panel (d), we show the distribution of normalized patent
values.
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flects differences across technologies, perhaps because science is used predominantly in technologies
that are on average more valuable. It has been noted that “to a considerable extent the scientific
enterprise evolves in disciplines that from their beginnings have been closely tied to fields of tech-
nology” (Stephan, 1996). This is why we ask how much of the patent value is technology specific
and how much can be attributed to the value of science.
To be able to separate science-related from non-science-related patent value, we need to make
assumptions about the data generating process. We assume that the value of a patent is generated
by a technological component, a science component, and an idiosyncratic component, and that these
components are additively separable. The technological component is assumed to be the same for
all patents with the same technology class and the same filing year, independent of their distance
to science. The science component is present in patents closely based on science while it is absent
in patents unrelated to science. The idiosyncratic component captures the patent value residual
after accounting for the science and technological components. We assume that the idiosyncratic
component has an expected value of zero.
Under these assumptions, we can isolate the technological component by looking at the average
value of patents that are not science-related. The value of non-science-related patents is the sum
of the technological component and the idiosyncratic component whereas by definition the science
component is zero. As the technological component is assumed to be the same for all patents in the
same technology class and year, we can filter out the idiosyncratic component by taking averages.
In the following, we define patents that have a distance to science of four as patents that derive little
or no value from science. This choice is arbitrary but informed by the data. As shown in Figure
1, Panel (a), the average value of patents is falling as distance to science increases up to a distance
of 4. For larger distances, the average patent value remains constant. This suggests that science
adds little additional value if a patent has a distance to science of four or larger. If patents with
a distance of four still derive value from science, our estimates for the value of science represent a
lower bound.
Figure 1, Panel (c) presents the average science value within technology classes by distance to
science. To derive these values for patents of different scientific intensity, we calculate the difference
between the value of a patent of a given distance to science and the value of a (D-4)-patent of the
same technology and year. Then we take averages over all patents of a given distance. Patents that
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are directly based on science (D=1) have an average science-value of $ 2.9 million dollars. This
means a (D=1)-patent is on average $ 2.9 million dollars more valuable than a (D=4)-patent of the
same technology class, filed in the same year. Patents that are indirectly based on science (D=2 and
D=3) have an implied science value of $ 2.2 and $ 0.9 million dollars, respectively. This is how much
value they add to patents over and above the technology component. These values are significantly
lower than the raw values presented in Panel (a) of Figure 1. This indicates that science-intensive
patents are indeed more prevalent in high-value technologies than in low-value technologies.
In Figure 1, Panel (d), we show the distribution of the sum of the science value component and
the idiosyncratic component; i.e., the residual in value that is not due to the technology and year,
across the percentiles of the value distribution.3 Less science-intensive patents tend to have values
close to the median of the value distribution. Science-intensive patents instead are more likely to
have a value that is in the tails of the science value distribution. Relative to a (D=4)-patent in
the same technology and year, more science-intensive patents are more likely to be in the upper
and the lower tail of the value distribution. This suggests that the value premium of science over
and above the value of the technology comes at the price of an increasing risk of tail outcomes.
One potential explanation for this could be the high rate of irreproducible research results which
has been said to be as as high as 50 percent (Osherovich, 2011; Freedman et al., 2015). Thus, the
science value premium may to some extent be the compensation for the risk that investors associate
with science-intensive patents. In Appendices B and C we show that these results are robust to
alternative method choices and aross technologies.
3.2 Patent novelty and patent value
As argued above, the goal of science is to advance knowledge by making new discoveries. This why
we study next whether the value of a patent is related to the novelty of its content. For this purpose,
we construct a new measure of patent novelty. Using this new measure, we establish as the second
fact that patent novelty predicts patent values.
In the history of technology and innovation, inventions are often conceptualized as the outcome
of successfully combining ideas, either by combining new ideas or resources or by combining ex-
isting ones in a novel way. In A History of Mechanical Inventions, Abbott Payson Usher writes:
3We cannot separately identify the science-value from the idiosyncratic value component for a particular patent.
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Figure 2: Patent novelty, patent value and risk.
Panel (a) shows the average patent value for every likelihood of pairwise combinations of words that occur in a
particular patent as an indicator for patent novelty. Smaller probabilities are interpreted as higher novelty. The
winsorized values are marked with X. The size of the bubbles represents the number of patents underlying each point.
Panel (b) shows the distribution of patent values across the percentiles of the value distribution of all patents for
patents with below average pairwise word combination probability (solid red line) and for above average pairwise
word combination probability (dashed blue line). In Panel (c), we plot the average residualized patent value by
residualized pairwise word combination probability. We residualize the value and the word combination probability
for the interaction of CPC technology class and filing year. Panel (d) shows the distribution of residualized patent
values by distance of patents to science across the percentiles of the value distribution of all patents for patents with
below average pairwise word combination probability in a technology and year (solid red line) and for above average
pairwise word combination probability in a technology and year (dashed blue line).
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“Invention finds its distinctive feature in the constructive assimilation of preexisting elements into
new syntheses, new patterns, or new configurations of behavior” (Weitzman, 1998). Economist
Joseph Schumpeter defines the essence of enterprise and entrepreneurship to be “the carrying out
of new combinations.” In The Theory of Economic Development, he writes that: “As a rule, the
new combinations must draw the necessary means of production from some old combinations . .
. development consists primarily in employing existing resources in a different way, in doing new
things with them” (Schumpeter, 1934).
Following this concept of invention as a novel combination of ideas or resources, we develop a
new measure for patent novelty that is based on the content of the patent. More specifically, we
measure how novel the combinations of words are that are used in a patent. For example, the word
“mouse” combined with the word “trap” was used in patents since at least 1870. In contrast, the
word “mouse” was combined with the word “display” for the first time in 1981 in the pioneering
patents of Xerox.
Our measure of patent novelty is constructed as follows. In a first step, we count how often a
particular pairwise combination of different words was used in the abstracts of previous patents up
to the filing year. The sets of words for every patent are taken from the dataset of Arts et al. (Arts
et al., 2018). We then divide this count with the total number of pairwise word combinations up to
the filing year of the patent. We denote this ratio as the probability of a word combination. In a
second step, we take the average over the respective probabilities of all pairwise word combinations
within a patent to determine the average probability per patent. The smaller the average probability
of pairwise word combinations, the more novel are the pairwise word combinations used in the
particular patent. We call patents with a smaller average probability more novel.
Figure 2 shows that the novelty of a patent – measured by the average probability of word
combinations – predicts the patent value and the likelihood that the value of a patent is in the
tails of the distribution. Panel (a) shows that there is a positive relationship between novelty and
patent value. Panel (b) indicates that a higher patent novelty is associated with an upward shift
in the patent value distribution. For this purpose, we split all patents into those that have a below
average probability of word combinations (i.e., higher novelty) and those that have an above average
probability. Figure 2, Panel (b) shows that more novel patents (i.e., patents with a low probability
of word combinations) are less likely to be at the lower end of the value distribution and more likely
10
to be at the upper end. The picture is reversed for patents that are less novel.
In Panel (c), we plot the relationship between patent novelty and patent value relative to (D=4)-
patent values of the same technology and the same year to control for technology-specific effects.
Again, there is a clear positive relationship between novelty and science value. In Panel (d), we
show the distribution of the sum of the science and the idosyncratic value component across the
percentiles of the value distribution for patents with higher or lower novelty; i.e., patents with
below average and above average probability of word combinations relative to the probability of a
(D=4)-patent in the same technology and year. Highly novel patents are again more likely to be
in the tails of the value distribution while patents with a lower novelty are in the middle of the
value distribution, relative to its technology and year. Thus, as in the case of science, novelty is
associated with a value premium over and above the technology-related value component, but also
with higher risk. “Newness is not, by itself, an economic advantage” (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986).
A comparison of Figures 1 and 2 reveals that the patterns displayed are strikingly similar.
While not being conclusive, this suggests that the science content of a patent and the novelty of the
patent content are related. Consistent with this intuition, we establish as a third fact that patents
that are more science-intensive exhibit a higher patent novelty on average. In Panels A and B of
Figure 3, we show the novelty distributions for relatively more science-intensive patents (D=1, D=2,
D=3) and for relatively less science-intensive patents (D=4, D=5, D>5, unconnected). As defined
above, the lower the likelihood of a pairwise word combination in a patent is, the more novel is the
patent. Panel (a) shows the novelty distribution for the raw data. In Panel (b) of Figure 3, we
adjust for differences in technology and year. The novelty distribution for more science-intensive
patents has its peak to the left and at a higher density than the novelty distribution for less science-
intensive patents, both in the raw data and when controlling for technologies. This confirms that
more science-intensive patents contain more novel word combinations; i.e., they are more novel. In
Appendix C.5, we show that these findings are robust to using the emergence of new words and the
average age of words as alternative novelty indicators.
3.3 Patent novelty and distance to science
As argued above, there are two complementary ways in which science can increase patent novelty.
First, science might provide new insights that can be combined with older ideas. This view is akin
11
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Figure 3: Patent novelty and distance to science.
Panel (a) shows the kernel density plot of the average likelihood of pairwise combinations of words that occur in
a particular patent for more science-intensive patents (D=1, D=2 or D=3; red line) and for less science-intensive
patents (D>3 or unconnected; dashed blue line). Smaller probabilities are interpreted as a higher novelty. In Panel
(b), we residualize the patent value and the likelihood of word combinations by the average value of a patent with
the same technology class and filing year and a distance of four. In Panel (c), we plot the average likelihood of
word combinations (x-axis) along with the 10th percentile of the word novelty in a patent. We use different colors
to indicate which share of patents is science-intensive. We distinguish areas with a large share of science-intensive
patents (>75th percentile, red - dark shaded), an intermediate share of science-intensive patents (25th-50th percentile,
green - medium shaded) and a low share of science-intensive patents (<25th percentile, grey - light shaded). We only
keep data points with at least 100 patents. In Panel (d), we adjust the likelihood of word combinations and the word
probability by technology class and filing year.
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to how Vannevar Bush described the relation between science and invention in his influential 1945
report Science: The endless frontier. “Basic science (...) creates the fund from which the practical
applications of knowledge must be drawn. New products and new processes do not appear full-
grown. They are founded on new principles and new conceptions, which in turn are painstakingly
developed by research in the purest realms of science. Today, it is truer than ever that basic research
is the pacemaker of technological progress” (Bush, 1945). This description is thought to reflect the
realities in the large science-intensive corporate laboratories of the post-war period (Smith and
Hounshell, 1985; Godin, 2006).
Second, science can guide the inventor to more fruitful combinations of known elements (Rosen-
berg et al., 1990; Fleming and Sorenson, 2004). According to mathematician Henri Poincaré, “the
true work of the inventor consists in choosing among (...) combinations so as to eliminate the useless
ones or rather to avoid the trouble of making them” (Weitzman, 1998). Science can help tell which
combinations not to pursue by providing an understanding of why a combination might or might
not work. For example, enormous amounts of energy and ingenuity were wasted by alchemists on
attempts to transform lead into gold before science demonstrated that nothing short of an atomic
reaction could achieve this end. Scientific knowledge also guided the development of the Haber-
Bosch method to synthesize ammonia. During the first trial runs, Carl Bosch struggled with the
problem that the hydrogen proved to be corrosive for the high-pressure reactor chamber made of
steel. Using basic chemistry, he deduced that the problem was due to the carbon contained in the
steel walls of the chamber. His solution was to build a double wall reactor chamber with iron on
the inside, which contains no carbon, and steel on the outside (Jeffreys, 2008).
To operationalize these two views of how science might help the development of new technologies,
we distinguish how novel the word combinations in a patent are from how novel the single words in
a given patent are. To classify words in a patent as more or less novel, we calculate for each word
the ratio of how often a particular word has been used before relative to the total number of words
used. We call a word more novel the smaller this ratio; i.e., the smaller the probability a particular
word has been used before. Then we take the 10th percentile of this probability distribution of
word usage within a patent to arrive at a single measure of word novelty. If we find that science-
intensive patents use new words to create new combinations, this will support the view that science
provides new building blocks for the invention. In contrast, if science-intensive patents use novel
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combinations of common words, this will be in line with science guiding the inventor to valuable
combinations of known elements.
Panel (c) of Figure 3 shows for each patent the novelty of the pairwise word combinations on
the horizontal axis and the measure for word novelty on the vertical axis. We distinguish areas
with a large share of science-intensive patents (red - dark shaded), an intermediate share of science-
intensive patents (green - medium shaded) and a low share of science-intensive patents (grey - light
shaded). Without adjusting for differences in technologies, science-intensive patents do not tend
to use more novel words than non-science-intensive patents. If we adjust for technology and year,
we find that a larger share of patents with novel words are science-intensive, as shown in Figure 3,
Panel (d). This is in line with the intuition that science introduces new concepts that are combined
successfully into novel combinations to develop new inventions.
4 Conclusion
Our study shows that science adds value to the private sector on a broad scale. This is far from
obvious, given the public good nature of scientific knowledge and the skepticism expressed in several
studies about the effectiveness of the knowledge transfer from university to industry and about
the reliability of academic science (Goozner, 2005; Butler, 2008; Harris, 2011; Osherovich, 2011;
Freedman et al., 2015; Bikard, 2018). Understanding how much value science creates for society is
fundamental for the case of public science funding. By illuminating the commercial value of science,
our study provides a lower bound for its total value for society. Extrapolated to the U.S. economy,
we find this lower bound for the additional value created by science for marketplace inventions to be
720 U.S. dollars per capita and year. This is about 25% of the total value of patented inventions in
the U.S. (Appendix D). Thus, while scientists since Isaac Newton have been known to see further
“by standing on the shoulders of giants”, our study suggests that many inventors in the private
sector see further by standing on the shoulders of science.
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Appendix
A Data
For our analysis, we calculate distance to science for each patent following the method of Ahmadpoor
and Jones (Ahmadpoor and Jones, 2017). We then match this data with patent values calculated
by Kogan et al. (Kogan et al., 2017) and with patent characteristics from a variety of sources. We
use all patents that have a non-missing patent value and in whose technology class and filing year
there is at least one patent with a distance to science of four.
Distance=1
D=2
D=2
D=3
Papers Patents
Figure 4: Distance to science
Notes: This figure is adapted from (Ahmadpoor and Jones, 2017). It shows the distance to science for patents based
on citation proximity to scientific articles.
Distance to science: Ahmadpoor and Jones (Ahmadpoor and Jones, 2017) define a patent’s
distance to science using citation links.4 A patent that directly cites a scientific paper has a distance
to science of one (D=1). Patents cite academic articles or other patents to give credit to prior art
on which the technology disclosed in the patent is based. Patent-to-article citations are used in
many recent papers to capture the link between science and innovation, e.g. Arora et al. (Arora
et al., 2017) and Azoulay et al. (Azoulay et al., 2015).5 A patent that cites a (D=1)-patent but no
scientific article has a distance of two (D=2), and so on (Figure 4). Citing another patent that is
based on a scientific article provides evidence that the citing patent is also based to some degree on
4We thank Mohammad Ahmadpoor and Ben Jones for sharing their data.
5Roach and Cohen (Roach and Cohen, 2013) suggest that patent-to-article citations reflect knowledge flows from
academia to the private sector better than the commonly used patent-to-patent citation.
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science, but less directly so.
To determine the distance-to-science of individual patents we use data from Marx and Fuegi
Marx and Fuegi (2019), which provides a link from academic articles in Microsoft Academic to
patents. Then we use data in PATSTAT to obtain patent-to-patent citations. We cross-check the
values of our distance-to-science measure based on Marx and Fuegi Marx and Fuegi (2019) with
the values calculated by Ahmadpoor and Jones (Ahmadpoor and Jones, 2017). In cases where
Ahmadpoor and Jones (Ahmadpoor and Jones, 2017) arrive at a smaller distance to science, we
substitute their values.
Sources:
https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/108362/version/V12/view
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/project/academic/
https://www.epo.org/searching-for-patents/business/patstat.html#tab-1
Patent value: We match the distance-to-science information with the data on patent values of
Kogan et al. (Kogan et al., 2017). Kogan et al. (Kogan et al., 2017) use abnormal stock market
returns around the publication date of the patent to infer the value of a patent. Therefore, the data
measures the ex-ante expected net present value of the patent for the filing company. This dataset
contains patent values for 1.8 million U.S. patents filed between 1926 and 2009.
Source: https://iu.app.box.com/v/patents
Patent novelty: For our novelty measure, we use information on words in patents from Arts
et al. (Arts et al., 2018). Arts et al. (Arts et al., 2018) tokenize the titles and abstract texts of
patents, clean and alphabetically sort the resulting words. The resulting word vector contains on
average 37 words per patent and in sum 526,561 words. For the novelty measure, we count how
often a particular pairwise word combination occurs in a patent abstract and standardize it with the
total number of pairwise word combinations up to this year. We also calculate for each word how
common it is. To do this, we count for each word how often it was used in the past and standardize
it with the total number of words used.
Source: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/patenttext
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Other patent characteristics:
• Text similarity: We calculate the pairwise text similarity between a patent and the articles
cited in the patent. Then we take the maximum over all the similarities of a patent to its cited
articles to determine the distance to the closest article. To calculate the similarity between
the abstracts of the article and of the patent we use the “term frequency-inverse document
frequency” (tf-idf) method. We use the “gensim” implementation in Python for our calculations
(https://radimrehurek.com/ gensim/). Article abstracts are from the OpenAcademic Graph
(Tang et al., 2008; Sinha et al., 2015) and patent abstracts are from Patstat. For each term
used in the abstracts of the patent and the article, tf-idf measures how often this word appears
in the abstract and then standardizes this value with the probability that this term appears
in general. Using the tf-idf value for each term, we can build a word vector for each of the
abstracts. Then we determine the similarity between the abstracts of the patent and the
article abstract by calculating the correlation between the two-word vectors. If a patent cites
several articles, we take the maximum in similarity.
Source: https://www.openacademic.ai/oag/ 1
• Patent scope is from Kuhn and Thompson (Kuhn and Thompson, 2017). Specifically, we
use the z-score within art unit for our results.
Source: http://jeffreymkuhn.com/index.php/data/
• All other patent characteristics are from Patstat
Source: https://www.epo.org/searching-for-patents/business/patstat.html
B Results in Regression Form
We investigate the relationship between patent values and distance to science using regression
methods. Results are presented in Table 1. We find that a patent that directly cites an academic
article (D=1) has an average value of 17.8 million dollars (column 1). This value decreases with
distance to science. Patents with a distance of two have on average a value of 14.1 million dollars
while patents with a distance larger than three have a value between 8 and 11 million dollars.
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Patents that are completely unconnected to science have a value of 8.0 million dollars. The higher
average value of science-intensive patents reflects an upward shift in the value distribution of patents
with higher science intensity. This is shown in regression form in Table 2. In columns (1) and (2),
we use the probability of a patent having a value in the top and in the bottom 5% of all patent
values as outcomes. Patents that are closer to science have a higher likelihood to be in the top 5%
and a lower likelihood to be in the bottom 5%.
In column 2 of Table 1, we present the average science component of the patent value by distance
to science. In the regression, we use technology class × filing year fixed effects and leave out the
dummy for (D=4)-patents. Patents that are directly based on science (D=1) have an average
science-value component of $ 2.9 million dollars. Patents that are indirectly based on science (D=2
and D=3) have a science-value component of $ 2.2 and $ 0.9 million dollars, respectively. Columns
3 and 4 in Table 1 show that the pattern is robust to using forward citations or patent scope as
alternative measures of patent value.
Additive separability of the technological and the science components is the simplest one among
many potential assumptions about the relationship of science and non-science contributions to
patent value. One alternative could be to assume multiplicative separability instead. In column 5
of Table 1, we present estimates using the logarithm of value as an outcome variable. The estimates
show the same pattern, with (D=1)-patents more valuable than (D=2) and (D=3)-patents, which
in turn are more valuable than a patent of distance of four.
The increase in value due to science also comes with an increased likelihood of tail outcomes
accounting for technology and year. In Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2, we use the likelihood that a
patent is in the top 5% or bottom 5% of the distribution of the science component as an outcome.
The distribution is taken over all patents. Patents that are closer to science have a higher likelihood
to be in the tails of this distribution. So, accounting for the technological component, science-based
patents show a larger variance in values.
One potential concern one might have about our estimation of the science premium of patents
is that the distance to science calculated by citations might measure not only how much a patent
uses science but also the quality of the inventor. A high-quality inventor might be more aware of
scientific research and therefore include more citations, but without actually using science.
To see whether patents close to science make use of its content, we compare the texts of scientific
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articles and the text of patents. We calculate the pairwise text similarity between a patent and the
articles cited in the patent. Then we take the maximum over all the similarities of a patent to its
cited articles to determine the distance to the closest article. To calculate the similarity between the
abstracts of the article and of the patent we use the “term frequency-inverse document frequency”
(tf-idf) method.6
The results presented in column 6 of Table 1 show that patents with a citation distance of D=1
have a higher text similarity to scientific articles than patents more distant to science. This suggests
that citation distance reflects indeed how much a patent is related to science. Consistent with the
idea that patents with more scientific content have a higher value, column 7 shows that the value
of a patent increases with its text similarity to scientific articles. This suggests that the relation
between citation distance and patent value presented as our main result above is not a result of a
spurious correlation driven by third factors that are unrelated to the scientific content of the patent.
Why are patents based on scientific articles more valuable? Innovation is often thought of as
the new combination of ideas. To judge the novelty of an innovation protected by a patent we look
at pairwise combinations of words that occur in a particular patent. The words for every patent
are taken from Arts et al (Arts et al., 2018). We first count how often a particular pairwise word
combination was used in previous patents up to the filing year. We normalize the count of each
word combination with the total number of word combinations up to the filing year of the patent.
We denote this number as the probability of a particular word combination used in a particular
patent. In a second step, we take the average over the probabilities of all word combinations within
a patent to calculate the average probability per patent.
Column 8 of Table 1 shows the correlation between our patent novelty indicator and the average
dollar value. In column 9, we control for technology × year fixed effect.7 In both specifications,
higher novelty measured by a lower likelihood of word combinations increases the patent value. If
we do not control for technology and year, the effect is again driven by an upward shift in the whole
distribution. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 show that more novel patents are more likely to be in
the tails of the value distribution. Yet, once we look at the science value component we find that
closeness to science increases both, the likelihood of a patent being in the top 5% and the bottom
6We use the “gensim” implementation in Python for our calculations (see: https://radimrehurek.com/gensim/).
7Note that this specification differs from the one presented in Figure 2, because here we take the averages over all
patents in a technology and year combination and not only over patents with a distance of D=4.
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5% of the distribution (Columns 5 and 6).
Columns 10 and 11 of Table 1 show that patents that are closer to science are also more novel.
In Column 10, we show the raw correlation. Patents with a distance of one have a lower average
likelihood of word combinations than patents with a higher distance. In Column 11, we control for
average novelty in technology and year of patents with a distance of four. Again, patents closer to
science are more novel. In Columns 7 and 8 of Table 2, we use the likelihood that a patent is in the
top 5% or bottom 5% of the distribution of the science-value component as an outcome. Patents
that are more novel have a higher likelihood to be in the tails of this distribution. So, relative to
the technological component, more novel patents show a larger variance in values.
In Table 3, we show the share of science patents for different levels of average likelihood of word
combinations and the 10th percentile of the word novelty in a patent in order to replicate the results
in Panels C and D of Figure 3. To simplify the exposition we use dummy variables to indicate above
and below median values of the two independent variables. The highest share of patents with a
distance of science smaller than four (“science-intensive”) are among patents with a below median
likelihood of word combinations and a below median 10th percentile of the word novelty in a patent
(Column 1). This finding is robust if we look at the share of patents with a distance of one (Column
2) and if we control for technology and year (Columns 3 and 4).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Raw Controlling Tech × Year
Outcome: Share
D<4
Share
D=1
Share
D<4
Share
D=1
Below median likelihood of word combinations and word
probability
85 29 81 25
Below median likelihood of word combinations / above median
word probability
79 17 72 20
Above median likelihood of word combinations / below median
word probability
70 19 78 19
Above median likelihood of word combinations and word
probability
65 11 69 14
Obs. 1085180 1085180 1085128 1085128
Table 3: Share of science-intensive patents by novelty
This table shows the average share of patents with a distance of science smaller than four (Columns 1 and 3) and
with a distance of science of one (Columns 2 and 4) for different levels of average likelihood of word combinations
and the 10th percentile of the word novelty in a patent. To construct dummies for the different levels we split the
average likelihood of word combinations and the 10th percentile of the word novelty in a patent at their respective
medians. In Columns 1 and 2 we show the raw data and in Column 3 and 4 we adjust the average likelihood of word
combinations and the 10th percentile of the word novelty in a patent by technology and filing year.
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C Alternative data and method choices
In this section, we discuss the results using alternative data and methodological choices. In the next
subsection we use the alternative distance to science measures of Ahmadpoor and Jones (Ahmadpoor
and Jones, 2017), and in subsection 2 we use different normalizations to account for year and
technology effects. In Subsection 3, we show the effect over the whole value distribution. In
subsection 4 we split the results by technology, and in the last subsection we discuss word age as
an alternative measure for novelty.
C.1 Using Ahmadpoor and Jones distance values
In Figures 5a and 5b, we use the distance-to-science measure based on the data of Ahmadpoor
and Jones (Ahmadpoor and Jones, 2017). The data of Ahmadpoor and Jones (Ahmadpoor and
Jones, 2017) is based on Web of Science while our measure is based on the data of Microsoft
Academic. There are two main differences. First, Ahmadpoor and Jones (Ahmadpoor and Jones,
2017) have many more unconnected patents (165 thousand unconnected patents out of 0.8 million
overall patents) than we do (54 thousand unconnected patents out of 1.1 million overall patents).
Second, we aggregate the patents with a distance larger than 5 as the number of patents goes down
dramatically for larger distances. We find the same overall pattern; i.e., the patent values decrease
with distance to science in absolute and normalized values.
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Figure 5: Value of patents by distance to science
Panel (a) shows the raw data for patent values by distance to science data for a 10% sample of patents. The values
of U.S. patents are from Kogan et al. (Kogan et al., 2017) and the distance-to-science data are from Ahmadpoor
and Jones (Ahmadpoor and Jones, 2017). In Panel (b), we normalize the patent value by the average value of
a patent with the same CPC technology class and filing year and a distance of four.
C.2 Different normalizations and assignee-fixed effects
In the main part of the paper, we normalize the patent values by the value of patents with a distance
of 4 with the same technology class and filing year. One might ask whether patents with a distance
of D=4 are the right comparison group. As a robustness check, we use unconnected patents as
a control group and present results in Figure 6a. The quantitative magnitudes of the effects are
similar to our main specification. As a further alternative, we normalize using USPC instead of
CPC technology classes and present results in Figure 6b. The results are the same.
Another concern might be that by comparing patents with a different distance to science we
are comparing different company types. Some companies might be closer to science and at the
same time produce more valuable patents. If this were the case, our result might be driven by
assignee-fixed effects. Comparing patent values within assignee is difficult to do with the Kogan
et al. (Kogan et al., 2017) data. The reason is that all patents published by the same assignee at
the same date have the same value as their evaluation is based on the same abnormal stock market
returns. This is why for this exercise we use forward citations as an outcome variable. In Figure
28
6c, we normalize the number of forward citations by each combination of assignee, filing year and
technology class. This implies that we look only at citation differences within the same assignee.
We find the same pattern as in our main result.
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Figure 6: Different normalizations and assignee-fixed effects
In Panel (a), we show the average value of patents normalized by the value of patents that were filed in the same
year but are unconnected to science. In Panel (b), instead of the value of patents in the same filing year and CPC
patent classes we use patents in the same filing year and the same USPC patent classes. In Panel (c), we use forward
citations instead of patent values as the outcome and adjust for assignee-fixed effects.
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C.3 Effects over the entire value distribution
The main paper shows that average patent values decrease with distance to science relative to the
average value of a patent with the same filing year and the same CPC technology classification with a
distance of four. This pattern is already visible in the raw data in Figure 7a. In Figure 7b we show
the value by distance of science over the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile of the value distribution.
We residualize each percentile with the same percentile of patents with D=4.8 The patent values
are falling with distance to science over all percentiles. This confirms that our results are not driven
by outliers.
(a) Raw data
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Figure 7: Effects over the value distribution
Panel (a) shows the raw data for patent values by distance to science data for a 10% sample of patents. The values
of U.S. patents are from Kogan et al (Kogan et al., 2017). The distance to science of U.S. patents is calculated with
Marx and Fuegi Marx and Fuegi (2019) and Patstat using the method of Ahmadpoor and Jones (Ahmadpoor and
Jones, 2017). The distance to science is defined by citation links. A patent that directly cites an academic article has
a distance of D=1. A patent that cites a (D=1)-patent but not an academic article has a distance of D=2. Patents
are defined as “Unconnected” if there is no citation link to an academic article. In Panel (b), we show the average
patent value for all distances to science along with the number of patents in each distance. Panel (b) shows the 25th,
50th and 75th percentiles of the patent value distribution by distance to science normalized by its percentile at a
distance of 4.
8Here, we do not account for technology and year, as for many technology-filing year combinations there are not
enough patents to obtain a distribution for every distance to science.
30
C.4 Split by technology
One concern might be that the observed effects are driven by a single technology that benefits
particularly from science. This is not the case. In Figure 8, we show the main graph separately
for broad technology categories measured by one-digit CPC classes. Panels A and B show the raw
data. In Panels C and D we normalize by the average values of patents in the same four-digit CPC
technology classification and filing year. For all technologies, there is a decrease in value by distance
to science, most pronounced for drugs and chemicals. Results by other technology classifications
such as the classification in Hall et al. (Hall et al., 2001) and Schmoch (Schmoch, 2008) are available
from the authors on request.
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Figure 8: Sample splits by technology
In this figure, we split patents by broad technology fields measured by one-digit CPC classes. In Panels A and C we
show the raw data. In Panels B and D we normalize by the average patent value of a patent in the same four-digit
CPC class and filing year with a distance of 4.
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C.5 Alternative measures for novelty
In our main specification, we measure how likely or unlikely the word combinations used in a patent
are to determine the novelty of a patent. In Figures 9a and 9b, we use the data of Arts et al (Arts
et al., 2018) to calculate two alternatives measures for novelty. The first measure indicates whether
a patent has a new word. A word is new if it was not used in any patent before. Figure 9a shows
that the share of patents with a new word decreases monotonically with its distance to science.
The second measure is the average age of words used in a patent. We calculate the age of a word
by calculating the difference between the filing year and the filing year of the patent in which it
was first used. The average word age is systematically lower for patents that are closer to science
(Figure 9b). If word age is indicative for the age of the ideas they encode, patents closer to science
contain more novel ideas.
Both of the alternative novelty measures are positively related to patent value. Figure 9c com-
pares the patent value for patents with and without new words for each year. Patents with new
words are more valuable throughout the whole sample. Figure 9d shows the relation between the
average age of words of a patent relative to the year and technology class and the residualized patent
value. We see a negative relation between patent value and the average age of words.
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Figure 9: Value and novelty
Panel (a) shows the share of patents that have a new word by distance to science. A new word is a word that has
not been mentioned before in a patent according to the data of Arts et al (Arts et al., 2018). In Panel (b), we plot
the average word age by distance to science. The age of a word in a patent is the difference between the filing year of
the patent and the year the word was first used in a patent. In Panel (c), we plot the average dollar value of a patent
relative to a patent with the same filing year and CPC technology class separately for patents with and without a
new word over time. In Panel (d), we plot the average word age and the average patent value. The word age is
relative to the mean of patents in the same filing year and the same CPC technology class.
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Figure 10: The science value component across states - 2000 to 2005 average
This figure shows the value of patents per person and year in the U.S. (rows 1 and 2) and across states. We plot
separately the implied direct and the implied indirect value of science, as well as the value that is not related to
science. For each patent, we derive the value attributable to science by subtracting the average value of a patent with
the same filing year and the same CPC technology class with a distance equal to four from the patent value. If the
patent under consideration has a distance to science of one, we call the difference “Direct science value component.”
If the distance to science is larger than one we call the difference “Indirect science value component.” The “nonscience
value component” is the remainder of the patent value after subtracting the direct and the indirect science value. We
divide the aggregated value by the number of persons in the U.S. and the different states in 2000 to calculate per
capita values.
In the first row, we use only the patent values of Kogan et al. (Kogan et al., 2017) and aggregate to the whole United
States. In the second row, we use the data of Kogan et al. (Kogan et al., 2017) and add imputed values for those
patents for which no Kogan et al. (Kogan et al., 2017) data is available. We impute values for patents assigned
to companies by CPC technology class and filing year. In the following rows, we split patents by the state of the
inventor. The state of the inventor is from Li et al. (Li et al., 2014). If the inventors on a patent are located in
multiple states we assign a share of the value to each state. To ease presentation, we aggregate the 36 states with a
population of less than 6 million in 2000 to one (“States with <6 Mio Pop”).
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To understand the overall impact of science on private sector innovation we need to gauge how
much science contributes directly or indirectly to the patent value in the economy. In Figure 10, we
show the direct and indirect impact of science for all of the U.S. and for each state separately. For
this exercise, we use in the first row the science value component for the filing years 2000 to 2005,
sum them up and scale them by the U.S. population. The direct value of science is $ 203 dollars
per person and year; i.e., 7% of the total patent value of $ 2727 dollars per person and year. The
indirect value of science - i.e., the science value component of all patents with a distance to science
larger than one - is $ 519 dollars per person and year. This means that the indirect effect is more
than twice the size of the direct effect and accounts for around 70% of the overall effect of science,
which is $ 722. In total, science contributes 25% of the overall U.S. patent value per person.
This extrapolation is based on some strong assumptions. First, we assume that without science,
the science-intensive patents would have the average value of a patent in the same technology and
with the same filing year with a distance of four. Second, our estimates in the first row neglect
the value of patents of companies that are not publicly traded. In row two and the following rows,
we include an extrapolation for values of patents of companies that are not publicly traded based
on technology class, filing year and distance to science. However, these patents might be more or
less valuable than patents of public companies. Third, these estimates only include the private
value to companies, but not the additional value of innovation to consumers that is not reflected
in higher profits for the innovating companies. For these reasons, our estimate is most likely an
approximation of the lower bound of the value of science in the economy.
The benefits of science and innovation are not equally distributed across states (Figure 10). We
use the geolocated patent data of Li et al (Li et al., 2014) to assign patents to states along with the
imputed patent value data. The states are ordered by the total science value per capita. California,
New Jersey, and Massachusetts stand out in terms of overall value generated by patents. In terms
of value created directly and indirectly by science, it is California and New Jersey that come out
top, but science also plays a large role in Massachusetts and Texas. In contrast, North Carolina
and Florida derive little value from science.
In Figure 11a, we explore further the heterogeneity of the science value component over time
and across industries. In Panel (a), we show the total science value component of (D=1), (D=2)
and (D=3)-patents (“direct & indirect science value”) along with the patent value not related to
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science per person and year of all U.S. patents filed in the U.S. between 1990 and 2005. To assess
the economy-wide impact we extrapolate patent values by distance to science, technology class and
filing year to all patents assigned to companies in the economy.
In each year, the science component is around 25% of the total patent value per person. The
share of the science component in the overall patent value is largest in the years of the dotcom boom
when tech companies like Google developed their first patents. All dollars are deflated to 1982 in
accordance with the deflation used by Kogan et al. (Kogan et al., 2017). To put these numbers
in perspective, Panel (b) shows the total funding for R&D in the U.S. and the share funded by
universities per person. This data is from the National Science Foundation. Total R&D funding
was $ 686 dollars per person in 2005, while university funding was $ 95 dollars per person. In 2005,
the science value component was $ 1060 dollars per person and the total patent value $ 4083 dollars
per person and year.
The benefits of science and innovation, in general, are not equally distributed across industries.
To assign a patent to an SIC code, we use the data of Kerr (Kerr, 2008).9 Panel 11c shows the
average total value of patents by two-digit SIC code over the years 2000 to 2005. Both in terms of
total patent values and value derived from science industrial machinery is leading. On a per patent
basis, chemicals derive the largest value from science (Figure 11d).
9We thank Bill Kerr for sharing his data.
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Figure 11: The science value component over time
Notes: Panel (a) shows the value of U.S. patents per capita over time. For each patent, we derive the value attributable
to science by subtracting the average value of a patent with the same filing year and the same CPC technology class
with a distance of four from the patent value. If the patent under consideration has a distance to science of one, we
call the difference “Direct science value component” while if the patent has a distance larger than one we call the
difference “Indirect science value component.” “Nonscience value component” is the remainder of the patent value
after subtracting the direct and the indirect science value components. We divide the aggregated value by the number
of persons in the U.S. and the different states in 2000 to calculate per capita values. We use imputed values for patents
for which no Kogan et al. (Kogan et al., 2017) data is available. We impute values for patents assigned to companies
by CPC technology class and filing year. Panel (b) shows the average university and total R&D funding per person
and year. The data is from the NSF and deflated to constant 1982 dollars, as in Kogan et al. (Kogan et al., 2017).
In Panel (c), we split patents by industry and aggregate the values up for the year. The figure gives the total value
per industry averaged over the years 2000 to 2005. To split the value of each patent by industry, we use the data of
Kerr (Kerr, 2008), which gives a probabilistic transition table from USPC technology classes to SIC codes. In Panel
(d), we plot the average value per patent and per industry.
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